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Political Rights of Government Employees
Donald H. Buckley*
M ILLIONS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, and hundreds of thousands of cer-
tain state and local employees, are denied political rights enjoyed
by all other Americans. There are nearly three million federal em-
ployees, of whom 50.8 percent are professional, technical or administra-
tive personnel.' These federal employees and those individuals employed
by a state or local agency whose principal employment is in connection
with an activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
made by the United States or a federal agency are subject to the United
States Civil Service Commission rules regulating political activity.2
"State or local agency employees" means an individual employed by a
state or local agency whose principal employment is in connection with
an activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants made
by the United States or a federal agency. This does not, however, in-
clude those employed by educational or research institutions. Under
Civil Service rules, individuals may be removed from their employment
for doing what every other American may consider a constitutionally
protected right; namely, participating actively in partisan politics. 3
The Civil Service Commission rules which govern political activities
of federal and other affected employees had an early historical beginning.
President Jefferson in 1801 indicated his dissatisfaction with government
officials taking an active part in the election of public functionaries. 4
Evidence of executive concern for maintaining an impartial civil service
was seen in 1841 and 1877.5 Congress in 1883 passed the Civil Service
Act for the protection of government employees. It forbade specified
conduct relating to political contributions by government employees.6 In
1907, President Theodore Roosevelt revised the then existing Civil
Service Rule 1 to enlarge its scope. Rule 1 after revision is worthy of
note as it very closely resembles the present Civil Service Commission
rule. It provided that:
Persons, who, by the provisions of these rules are in the competitive
classified service, while retaining the right to vote as they please and
*B.S., John Carroll University; Fourth year student at Cleveland State Univ.,
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; Supervisor of Research Engineering, N.A.S.A.,
Lewis Research Center.
1 The Federal Career Service at Your Service (pamphlet), U.S.C.S.C. (1967).
2 Rule IV, § 4.1, U.S.C.S.C. (1940).
3 5 U.S.C. § 118 (1) (1964 ed.); 18 U.S.C. § 607 (1964 ed.).
4 10 Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents 98-99 (1899).
5 4 Id. at 52, 7 Id. at 450-451.
6 22 Stat. 403 (1883), 5 U.S.C. § 633 (1940).
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to express privately their opinions on all political subjects, shall take
no active part in political management or in political campaigns. 7
This rule guided the regulation of political activities of federal em-
ployees until Senator Carl A. Hatch of New Mexico introduced legisla-
tion to further control political activities of federal employees. The
legislation which became effective on August 2, 1939, was designated the
"Hatch Political Activities Act" 8 and is usually called simply the "Hatch
Act," even in Civil Service Commission decisions. The objectionable
section of the Act is Section 9 (A), the second sentence of which states: 9
"No officer or employee in the executive branch of the Federal Govern-
ment, or any agency or department thereof, shall take any active part in
political management or in political campaigns." In 1940, on President
Roosevelt's recommendation, Congress extended the Hatch Act by
amendment with Section 12 (A) to include certain state and local em-
ployees whose employment is directly connected with federally spon-
sored activities.10 It is the Hatch Act, its amendments, and the Civil
Service Commission rules based thereon," which today restrict the
political activities of so many individuals.
The maximum penalty for violating the Hatch Act as provided in
Section 9(B) is removal from office or position, 12 with a minimum
penalty of 30 days suspension without pay.13 The power to determine
violations of the Hatch Act was placed in the Civil Service Commission
in 1940.14
It is of interest to note that Congress has provided for exceptions to
the Act. Section 9(A) exempts policy-determining officers, heads of
departments and executive office personnel from the Act.1 Further, in
the 1940 Amendment to the Act, Congress gave the Civil Service Com-
mission the power to grant exemptions where there are "special or
unusual" circumstances.
Section 16 of the Act provides:
Whenever the United States Civil Service Commission determines
that, by reason of special or unusual circumstances which exist in
any municipality or other political subdivision, in the immediate
vicinity of the National Capitol in the States of Maryland and Vir-
ginia or in the municipalities the majority of whose voters are em-
7 Rule 1, U.S.C.S.C. (1907).
8 53 Stat. 410 (1939).
9 53 Stat. 1148 (1939).
10 54 Stat. 640 (1940).
11 Rule IV, § 41, U.S.C.S.C. (1940).
12 53 Stat. 410, § 9 (B) (1940).
13 5 U.S.C.A., § 7325 (1966 ed.).
14 54 Stat. 771 (1940).
15 53 Stat. 1148 (1939).
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ployed by the Government of the United States, it is in the domestic
interest of persons to whom the provisions of this Act are applicable,
and who reside in such municipality or political subdivision, to per-
mit such persons to take an active part in political management or
in political campaigns involving such municipality or political sub-
division, the Commission is authorized to promulgate regulations
permitting such persons to take an active part in such political man-
agement and political campaigns to the extent the Commission deems
to be in the domestic interest of such persons.
16
Civil Service Rule IV, Section 4.1, regulates such political activity.'
7
The Federal Personnel Manual describes those activities which are pro-
hibited and the requirements for areas of the country to qualify as
"Privileged Localities" for exemption from the Act.' s Under the Hatch
Act and Rule IV, an employee may not: 19 1) campaign for a political
party or candidate, 2) transport voters other than members of the family
to the polls to vote, 3) distribute campaign material, 4) march in a po-
litical parade, 5) promote political dinners, 6) take active part in con-
ventions, 7) initiate petitions or solicit signatures for petitions on behalf
of a partisan candidate, 8) distribute campaign literature, badges or
buttons, 9) be connected editorially or managerially with any newspaper
generally known as partisan, and 10) be a candidate for nomination or
election to a National, State, County or Municipal office.
Subchapter 5 of the Federal Personnel Manual of the Civil Service
Commission describes some ten other restricted political activities affect-
ing federal employees, and Chapter 15 of the Supplement defines those
political activity restrictions placed on certain State and local em-
ployees.20 The formulators of the Hatch Act and Civil Service Rule IV
have not placed restrictions on federal employees' right to vote.
Under Section 4-9 of the Manual, Subsection A (3),21 an employee
subject to the restrictions of the Hatch Act may sign a nominating
petition being circulated on behalf of a partisan condidate, but under
Subsection (B) 22 may not initiate or circulate such a petition. Appar-
ently, the distinction is that simply signing a petition is merely personal
expression, while circulating or initiating a petition on behalf of a candi-
date is political campaigning.
One of the most subtle restrictions imposed by the Commission is
Section 4-10 which deals with ill defined "expression of opinions." 23 It
16 54 Stat. 771 (1940).
17 Supra n. 2.
18 Fed. Per. Man. of U.S.C.S.C., Ch. 733 (1965).
19 Id., Subch. 4 (15).
20 Id., Supp. Ch. 15, also 5 U.S.C-A. § 1501 to 1508.
21 Id., Subs. A(3).
22 Id., Subs. B.
23 Id., Subch. 4 (10).
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states that employees have the right to express their opinions and views
on all political subjects and candidates as provided for in the Hatch Act.
This section then goes on to point out that public expression which may
be construed as taking a part in politics is prohibited. The practical
difficulty here is how to determine what expressions or stated opinions
will, in the eyes of the Commission, be sufficient to constitute a violation.
Another section of the rules prohibiting various activities which
is wrought with potential pitfalls for employees is Section 4-11, Sub-
section (A), dealing with publishing or writing for newspapers. An
employee may not publish or be connected editorially or in a managerial
position with a newspaper generally known as "partisan." 24 He may not
write any letter or article for publication, either signed or unsigned,
soliciting votes. According to Subsection (B) 25 the newspaper does not
have to be "continuously partisan"; being partisan at election time is
sufficient. It does not have to be officially connected with any party or
political organization. The Hatch Act gives federal employees the right
to express their opinions with respect to all political subjects and candi-
dates. While most would probably consider an editorial in a newspaper
an expression of an opinion, the Commission apparently feels that the
newspaper's political views would taint the article even if it were an
expression of an opinion on behalf of the opposition.
Section 4-12 of the rules, prohibiting the distribution of campaign
literature, badges or buttons, allows the individual the right to wear or
display the same unless when done as a part of organized politics or a
political campaign.2 1 What badge, button or sticker is not distributed as
part of some organized campaign? Do political parties go to the expense
of having such material produced without some organized plan as to
whom and how the material is to be distributed?
Another rule which borders on the absurd is that related to activities
on election day. An employee may not help to get out votes on election
day nor transport voters other than "members of his immediate family
to the polls." 27 This means of course that if a federal employee's neigh-
bor is ill on election day and is asked to drive a member of the neigh-
bor's family to the polls, the employee runs the risk of losing his
employment in an effort to be a good neighbor and a good responsible
citizen.
In examining cases over a ten year period following the enactment
of the Hatch Act, it must be admitted that the Civil Service Commission
exercised considerable self-restraint in its decisions and recommenda-
24 Ibid.
25 Id., Subs. B.
20 Id., Subch. 15.
27 Ibid.
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tions for removal from employment for violations of the Hatch Act.2 8
Nonetheless, in certain cases, the violation hardly seemed to justify the
penalty. In the matter of Samuel F. McClaren,29 for example, McClaren
was charged with four violations on the Hatch Act, one of which was
that he distributed political handbills. It was found that he had distrib-
uted some of them at a private sales pavilion. The case was heard by the
Commission on September 24, 1946, the alleged violation occurring dur-
ing the Roosevelt Administration. The handbill in question referred to
both President Roosevelt and his wife and read as follows:
No FOURTH TERM-FOR EITHER
A fourth term means more war, more indebtedness, more regi-
mentation, more Roosevelt-created emergencies, more taxes and
millions more miles of travel.
These words were considered by the Commission to be plainly political
and a violation of the Hatch Act and the Civil Service Commission's
Rule IV. McClaren was dismissed from his employment as a rural mail
carrier.
In the matter of J. Ernest Kerr,30 the concept that "agency" is not a
defense was applied by the Commission. Kerr, on leave from his Gov-
ernment employment, at the National War Labor Board where he was a
wage analyst, delivered a speech for a friend who was unable to do so.
Kerr was careful to preface the speech with statements to the effect that
the speech were the words of his friend, which he, Kerr, was merely
quoting. The Commission found that although he acted as an agent for
his friend, he had engaged in politically prohibited activity. (An inter-
esting aspect of the case was that the Commission heard the case when
Kerr was no longer a Government employee.)
The case of Wilson v. United States Civil Service Commission3l
demonstrates how extremely restricted the activities of Government
employees are and how carefully they must guard their actions. In this
case, a government employee, Wilson, mailed to a newspaper an isolated
unsolicited letter recommending the defeat of a certain partisan candi-
date for state office. This was found by the Commission to constitute a
violation of the Hatch Act, and was supported by the District Court
for the District of Columbia in a summary judgment for the Civil
Service Commission.3 2 The court said that federal employees "run a
risk when they express their political views," even though the Hatch Act
permits them to express their opinions on all political subjects and candi-
28 Irwin, Hatch Act Decisions of U.S.C.S.C., 3-57, G.P.O., Washington (1949).
29 Id. at 210.
30 Id. at 202.
31 Wilson v. United States Civil Service Commission, 136 F. Supp. 104 (D.C.D.C.
1955).
32 Id. at 107.
Sept. 1970
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dates. The Commission in the Wilson case appeared overzealous in its
willingness to discharge an employee for one single letter to a news-
paper expressing his views as to a candidate.
There have been violations of the Hatch Act where the party in-
volved ran for some elected office. One such case, In Re Ramshaw, 33
involved the removal of a civil service employee for running for the
elected office of sheriff. The Court upheld the Commission's decision.
The Courts have seemed reluctant to substitute their judgment for that
of the Commission.3 4
The Constitutional Question
The first case to question the constitutionality of the Hatch Act and
reach the Supreme Court for decision was United Public Workers of
America v. Mitchell in 1947. 35 The appellants, with the exception of one
George Poole, sought a declaratory judgment as to the legal limits of the
regulation. The Court held that this would be an advisory opinion
rather than a declaratory judgment and refused to take jurisdiction.
Poole, who had violated the Act, did present a justifiable case for declar-
atory judgment and the Supreme Court, 4 to 3 agreed that on the merits
the second sentence of Section 9 (A) of the Hatch Act was constitutional.
The issue in the case was whether the Hatch Act violated the political
rights reserved to the people under the Ninth and Tenth Amendments.
Justice Black, dissenting, raised the First Amendment Issue.
Three cases were relied on by the majority. Justice Reed, in his
opinion for the Court cited Ex Parte Curtis,36 United States v. Wurz-
bach37 and United States v. Thayer.38 The difficulty is that all three cases
dealt with the collection of money by federal employees from fellow
employees for political purposes. Poole, in the Mitchell case, violated the
Hatch Act because he held the position of a ward executive committee-
man of a political party while being federally employed as a roller in the
mint. The question of collection of money did not arise in Mitchell. It
would appear that the majority in the Mitchell decision balanced the
individual rights to engage in politics with Congressional judgment.
The Mitchell case holding the Hatch Act constitutional is the last con-
sideration of the Hatch Act by the Supreme Court.
In Meehan v. Macy (1968) ,39 the Court in reference to the Hatch
Act and the Mitchell decision, said that government employees have
33 In Re Ramshaw, 266 F. Supp. 73 (E.D. of Idaho 1967).
34 Gray v. Macy, 239 F. Supp. 658 (D.C. of Ore. 1965).
35 United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556 (1947).
36 Ex Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371, 1 S. Ct. 381 (1882).
37 United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S. Ct. 167 (1930).
38 United States v. Thayer, 207 U.S. 425, 28 S. Ct. 426 (1908).
39 Meehan v. Macy, 392 F. 2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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"lesser rights" than other individuals have under the constitution be-
cause of the restrictions placed on their political activity. The question
to be asked is, "why should they?"
The Hatch Act and the First Amendment
It was held in N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama40 that the right of political
association is clearly protected by the First Amendment. The case of
United States v. Robel4 ' demonstrates the extent to which the Court
will go to protect the rights of individuals to associate under the First
Amendment. In that case, the Court held that a registered Communist
could not be denied his right to hold a job in a "defense facility" simply
because he was a Communist. The Court held that Section 5 (A) (1) (D)
of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 was unconstitutional
because it ran afoul of the First Amendment. The Court said in essence
that one's right to a job could not be made to depend on the exercise
of his right of association which is protected by the First Amendment.
It is difficult to see how it is unconstitutional to deny one the right to
work in a "defense facility" simply because he belongs to an organiza-
tion which advocates the overthrow of our form of government, but it is
constitutional to deny millions of individuals the right to actively engage
in normal political activities which are part of the very essence of our
form of government.
Even at the time of Madison and Hamilton the political rights of the
people were fully recognized. 42 They tell us that our political privileges
are of two kinds. The first is that the people have all political authority
and the second, that the people play an active and dominant part in the
administration of the government. In both of these relationships, the
"Federalist" declares that the citizens, as the sovereign power, must be
kept free from any dependence on their representatives. In the eyes of
Madison and Hamilton, would employees under the Hatch Act be con-
sidered free from dependence upon their representatives?
In regard to the First Amendment the assumption is made by the
Supreme Court that this includes freedom of association in political
organizations. 43 This assumption is based upon the belief that unless
people can join together in political organizations their First Amend-
ment right to speak freely is inhibited. Further, the Court in Pickering
v. Board of Education,44 a case involving a teacher's right to criticize his
40 N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct. 1163 (1958).
41 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 88 S. Ct. 419 (1967).
42 Hamilton, Madison and Jay, The Federalist or the New Constitution, 253 (1787-
1791).
43 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247 (1960); Louisiana v. N.A.A.C.P.,
366 U.S. 293, 81 S. Ct. 1333 (1961); Communist Party of United States v. Subversive
Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 81 S. Ct. 1357 (1961).
44 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S. Ct. 1731 (1968).
Sept. 1970
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supervisors handling of tax funds, said that the threat of dismissal from
public employment is a very potent means of inhibiting speech. This is
the very penalty imposed by the Hatch Act.
The foregoing decisions indicate that the Court has held the right
to associate in political activities is a right protected by the First Amend-
ment, and that to make employment contingent upon the non-exercise of
that right clearly inhibits First Amendment rights. It is difficult, indeed,
to reconcile the Mitchell decision with these more recent cases.
The Hatch Act and the Fifth Amendment
With respect to the Act being so discriminatory, as to violate due
process under the Fifth Amendment, it could hardly be doubted that the
Act denies rights to federal and certain state and local employees en-
joyed by other citizens. In order for such classification to be lawful, it
must be reasonable and designed to promote a compelling government
interest.45 The standard test applied to determine whether legislation
is classifying or discriminating is the "without any reasonable basis"
test. It was first applied in the case of Lindsley v. National Carbonic
Gas Co.46 If a logical or reasonable basis is wanting the courts will
consider it discriminatory. In Shapiro v. Thompson,47 the Supreme Court
said that the standard test does not apply in cases where fundamental
rights are involved. In those cases where classification touches on a
fundamental right, the constitutionality of the legislation must be judged
by a stricter standard. The stricter standard is that for the classification
to be held constitutional, it must promote a compelling state or govern-
mental interest.
At a time when the Courts are rendering decisions to give equal
protection with respect to political rights, it is difficult to envision just
how the Hatch Act might be held constitutional. When Chief Justice
Warren was asked, at his retirement from the bench, which decision he
felt was the most important during his almost sixteen years in the
Supreme Court, he cited Baker v. Carr.48 That case dealt with re-
apportionment and the affirmation of the concept of the one man-one
vote. The appellants claimed a denial of equal protection of the laws
because of debasement of their votes. The Court, in deciding the case,
considered that it involved the vindication of a political right, rather
than being a political question.
It should be noted that Baker v. Carr dealt not with a denial of the
right to vote but with a diminution of the effect of a vote. What the
court said in essence was that "the right to vote" includes more than the
45 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969).
46 Linsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S. Ct. 337 (1911).
47 Supra n. 45.
48 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691 (1962).
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simple casting of a ballot. Incorporated within "the right to vote" is the
right to have that vote count equally with every other vote. Can it be
denied that the selection of those to be voted for, and the support of
those individuals throughout a campaign is just as much a part of the
voting process? In N.A.A.C.P. v. Button49 the Court said that every
citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and asso-
ciation. Certainly, political expression and association must include the
right to actively assist in the selection and support of political candidates.
Arguments in Favor of the Act
The arguments most frequently advanced in favor of the Hatch Act
and the Civil Service Commission rules relating to it is that it protects
federal and other affected employees from efforts to force the rendering
of political service or tribute.50 The purpose of the Act and the Com-
mission rules as stated by the Commission are twofold. The first is to
protect tenure of Government employees by taking political activity out
of employment and promotion. The second is to take the dismissal of
government employees out of the political arena. The difficulty is that
the cure is worse than the disease.51
While one must be impressed with the concern expressed by the
formulators of the Hatch Act and the Civil Service Rules for the well-
being of federal employees, their reasoning is difficult to follow. Con-
sider an analogy which may help to establish the illogic of their logic.
Let us say that a certain city the name of which shall remain anonymous
has a park called Central Park. The City finds it is unsafe for a female
to walk in the park because of attackers. The city passes an ordinance
designed to protect its female populous. The ordinance denies access to
the park to all females except those accompanied by two large males in
excess of six feet in height and who weigh more than 200 pounds each,
the major portion of which must be muscle and not fat. Common sense
would dictate that rather than deny females the right of enjoyment of
the park, the better, more sensible approach would be to better police
the park with a more diligent effort to apprehend and prosecute those
who would make the presence of females in the park unsafe.
The same kind of reasoning can be applied to the protection of fed-
eral and other affected employees. Rather than deny these citizens the
fundamental rights guaranteed them by the constitution, let Congress
and the Civil Service Commission enact laws and rules, in the case of
the latter, that are aimed at those who would seek to corrupt and exploit
government, state and local employees. Certainly, legislators can devise
49 N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 505, 83 S. Ct. 328 (1963).
50 Political Activity-Rules for Federal Employees, Fed. Emp. Facts No. 2, March,
1964.
51 5 U.S.C.A. Sec. 7324 (1966 ed.).
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laws which are designed to punish the wrongdoer without denying fed-
eral employees, those of who the late President John F. Kennedy said,
"the success of the Government, and thus the success of our Nation
depend ... ." 52 the rights enjoyed by all other citizens.
Congress and the Civil Service Commission in effect have already
provided the required proscription of certain activities. Many of the
sections of the Hatch Act as enacted contain provisions aimed at the
proper parties. Section 1 is designed to prevent intimidation or coercion
of voters, Section 2, interference with elections, Section 3, the promise
of benefits for support, Section 5, contributions for political purposes,
Section 8 provides penalties for violators. Section 11 of the Hatch Act is
a saving clause, holding that if any provision of the Act is held invalid
the remainder of the Act shall not be affected.
It appears, therefore, that should Section 9 (A) of the Hatch Act
and Rule IV of the Commission be held unconstitutional, much of the
needed legislation to protect federal, state and local employees would
still exist for their benefit. They would only lose legislation which has
denied them First and Fifth Amendment rights enjoyed by other
citizens.
Another argument advanced in favor of the Hatch Act is that of
protecting the public interest. It is argued to be in the best interest of
the nation that federal employees not actively engage in politics. Here
the potential evils of political involvement must be weighed against the
denial of First Amendment rights. Any law, however, which impairs
First Amendment rights must be aimed at removing the "clear and
present danger" of a substantial evil. The evil sought to be prevented
must be imminent, serious, involving some act and with a fair prob-
ability of its uprooting orderly proceedings. In light of these elements,
necessary for the evil to warrant denial of First Amendment rights, it is
difficult to imagine how (in the Mitchell case 53), Poole's activity as a
ward committeeman had any effect on his job as a roller in the mint or
adversely affected the public interest. It is equally difficult to imagine,
even multiplying Poole's situation a thousand times and adding numer-
ous variations thereto, that the "evil" of such activity is seriously going
to affect the public interest or well-being.
Conclusions
It is submitted that the right to vote is accompanied by corollary
rights in securing proper candidates. All citizens must exert efforts to
ensure that the proper parties are selected to run for office. The active
participation in the placing of candidates on the party platform is every
52 Supra n. 1.
53 Supra n. 35.
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bit as important as the act of voting for them. To deny federal and
certain state and local employees the right to actively assist in this
selection process is in essence to deny them an essential role in the very
nature of our form of government. Democracy, by its very definition,
means political equality for all. If we are to ensure that our form of
government will prevail, we must ensure that all of our citizens enjoy
the same fundamental right to assist in that mechanism which helps to
maintain a government that truly represents the full choice of all the
people. To deny federal, and certain state and local employees the right
to participate in political activities is to deny them a voice in the selec-
tion of those who will govern, abridging their fundamental right of asso-
ciation by lodging their rightful role in this selection process in the
hands of others.
In light of recent Supreme Court decisions 54 it is difficult to imagine
the Court upholding its decision in the Mitchell case55 were it to be
faced with a similar factual situation today. It is contended that Sec-
tion 9(A) of the Hatch Act and the United States Civil Service Com-
mission rules relating thereto, considering recent Court decisions, violate
the constitutional rights of millions of Americans. It is submitted that
they deny rights of political association guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment, and violate substantial due process guaranteed by the Fifth
Amendment.
54 Supra n. 40, 43, 44, 48 and 49.
55 Supra n. 35.
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